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I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expressive association under the First Amendment is
relatively new, with roots in Supreme Court doctrine tracing back only about
a half century.1 Further, First Amendment expressive association principles
are swiftly developing and expanding in a pattern begun only over the last
decade or so.2 Today, the very concept of expressive association is
undergoing rapid evolution, and the nature of constitutional protection is in a
state of considerable flux.3
While not formally recognized under the First Amendment, expressive
associations have existed for centuries in America in the form of religious,
political, and interest groups of virtually all stripes.4 This history is so deepseated that one scholar recently suggested that expressive activity by groups
is more basic and more important to the role of freedom of speech in our
democracy than speech by individuals.5
Simply stated, expressive association is “a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—

1. The case generally considered foundational is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
2. Among the recent cases are Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California
Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010); John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
3. Compare Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640, with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
4. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 982–1001 (2011).
5. Id. at 1024 (“[T]he associational speech perspective suggests that . . . sometimes such speech
is entitled to more protection than individual speech because such associational speech contributes
more directly to the core self-governance goals of the First Amendment.”).
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speech, assembly, petition . . . and the exercise of religion.”6 Under that
definition, it requires both an organization (the association itself) and a
purpose (a First Amendment activity).7 The right protects both individuals
and groups by limiting state interference in group activities even when the
group’s purposes may seem distasteful, and by limiting state action against
individuals who are part of such groups.8
But a rapid evolution of this freedom of expressive association in the
Supreme Court’s decisions has fostered considerable disorder in the settled
free speech landscape, and its continued development is likely to introduce
even further disarray.9 The uncertainty lies not only with the level of
protection accorded associational expression, but more basically at the
foundational, definitional level of what an expressive association is and what
qualities it must possess to qualify for constitutional protection. This
confusion goes to the First Amendment purposes served by such
associations and the various ways in which those purposes become manifest
in the form of an expressive association, as well as the distinct kinds of
expressive associations that exist and the distinct constitutional roles each
fulfills.10
Against this background of recent legal development and ongoing
scholarly and judicial attention, we undertake our inquiry. Our purposes are
limited, but important. Expressive associations, in our view, take many
forms and serve many and diverse constitutional purposes. The limits on
those forms and purposes are barely discernible from the Supreme Court’s
decisions; indeed, they are highly elastic and intertwined.11 Nonetheless, the
law has developed and expanded sufficiently to make the setting of limits
and the recognition of distinct typologies critical.12
Our goal is to begin organizing, defining, and classifying these different

6. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
7. Id.
8. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 811 (2001)
(Expressive association “protects organizations like the NAACP from being banned or persecuted
because state actors do not like their First Amendment activity . . . . It [also] protects an individual
from being punished or harassed for being a member of an organization like the NAACP.”).
9. See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, Speaking in the
First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483
(2001); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 2353 (2000).
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–59.
12. See infra Part IV.
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typologies of expressive association by identifying their essential forms and
the boundaries that should attach to the various and often overlapping forms
of collective First Amendment activity. To do so, we must traverse the
entire range of collective organization activity in fields as diverse as
education, commerce, religion, philosophy, research, self-reflection, and
political or economic action. Our goal is to cut across this wide array of
collective or cooperative human activity by thinking about the essential
forms that group expressive activity may take, and the justifications for
extending special First Amendment protection to some of the forms but not
others, and to some of the activities but not others. In short, we hope to
make a preliminary map of the legal landscape of expressive associations.
In so doing, we begin to flush out the values inherent in each form and make
broad suggestions as to the type of protection each may warrant.
We do not purport to be exhaustive in our mapping, but we aim to
identify the core elements of the key associational forms and the essential
landscape of constitutional protection. Part II briefly traces the Supreme
Court’s path toward the right of expressive association. Part III provides a
general discussion of the role, if any, of substantive distinctions among
beliefs in defining whether a group qualifies for constitutional protection as
an expressive association.
We then turn, in Part IV, to the core of our mapping exercise—
identifying the functional typologies. We categorize these typologies by
three key characteristics: inward-oriented expression versus outwardoriented expression;13 heterogeneous versus homogeneous associations;14
and finally, formed versus formless associations.15 In Part V, we conclude
by reflecting on the First Amendment principles reflected through each
typology.
These are all deeply interrelated inquiries, so our organization will
reflect the constantly circling and shifting course required to unwind,
organize, and reveal a map. Our conclusion will not be a test or a specific
definition, but instead a better understanding of the new legal characters now
populating the First Amendment landscape and a map of their domains.
II. THE PATH TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
Before embarking on our mapping exercise, we first explore briefly and
generally the formal law of expressive association. As this article will show,
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area of the law is far from

13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part IV.C.

26

BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 23, 2012]

1/10/2013 12:54 PM

Forms of Expressive Association
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

concrete;16 however, some basic principles can be gleaned from the Court’s
decisions over the past decades. These opinions mark the path from a
general freedom to associate to the more specific right to associate for
expressive purposes.
Freedom of association is a free-standing right,17 and just as individuals
have a right to associate with one another, they also have a right not to
associate.18 Arguably, this freedom is driven, at least in part, by the idea of
the “people” as sovereign.19 We could, thus, view the formation of an
association through two lenses—both as a reflection of this individual
sovereignty. In one view, an association is formed based on the autonomous
choice of individuals to join or not join together.20 On the other hand, the
focus can be shifted to the association as a whole—what are the rights of the
entity?21
The Supreme Court has divided freedom of association into two
categories—intimate associations and expressive associations.22 Intimate
associations, such as familial relationships, are those deriving from the term
“liberty” found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.23 In contrast,
expressive associations form in order to engage, at least in part, in activities
protected by the First Amendment.24 However, these groups need not be
engaged in advocacy25 or formed for the specific purpose of disseminating
information.26 Instead, to trigger First Amendment protection, the

16. See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–59.
17. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
18. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of association therefore
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”).
19. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 11 (2005) (“[A]ssorted
speeches, essays, and ratification texts emphasizing the ‘popular rights’ that ‘the people’ ‘retain’ and
‘reserve’ and may ‘resume’ and ‘reassume’ exemplified what the First Congress had centrally in
mind in 1789 when it proposed certain amendments as part of a general bill of rights.”).
20. This area of the law is much more well-settled. See Farber, supra note 9, at 1486 (“[Early]
cases provided some protection to the autonomy of the organizations as such, but more vigorously
defended the rights of members to join associations.”).
21. Id. at 1495 (“The focus in recent cases . . . is on the rights of the organization as an entity,
not on the rights of its individual members.”).
22. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18.
23. Id. at 618.
24. Id. (“[Expressive association is a] right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion.”).
25. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“The First Amendment’s protection
of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups.”).
26. Id. at 655 (“[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a
certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An association
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association must center on a shared set of beliefs, ideas, or values.27 It does
not matter whether the beliefs held relate to “political, social, economic,
educational, religious [or] cultural ends.”28 The values or all of the specific
beliefs held by the association, moreover, need not be held by every single
member of the association; it is enough that the association’s leadership
espouses a viewpoint.29
Acknowledging the existence of an expressive association does not end
the analysis. The Supreme Court has declared that expressive associations
receive First Amendment protection,30 so it follows that one must determine
how much protection these associations should receive. And that question is
dependent on why we want to protect these associations in the first place.
Much of the discussion about why associations qualify for protection
returns to the idea of the “people” of the United States as sovereign.31 Just
as the states have rights because they form the collective voice of the people,
so an association has rights, reflecting that same collective voice.32
Moreover, associations are important because they are a body unique from
the State. We protect expressive associations because we view as
fundamental the right of the people to assemble free from government
interference.33 In one view, these collective associations protect against the
power of the State. Freedom of expressive association “is crucial in
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather
express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”34 This is particularly true for those
associations that express themselves inwardly, sharing and exploring beliefs
and ideas to and among members free from public scrutiny or expression.35

must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to
protection.”).
27. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“[F]reedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”); see also Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at
650 (“It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages
in expressive activity.”).
28. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (“[Expressive association may be] in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”); see also NAACP, 357 U.S. at
460–61.
29. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 655 (“[T]he First Amendment simply does not require that every
member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group’s policy to be ‘expressive
association.’”).
30. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
31. See AMAR, supra note 19, at 11.
32. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
33. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE
L.J. 1, 4 (1964) (“In a society governed by democratic principles it is the individual who is the
ultimate concern of the social order. His interests and his rights are paramount. Association is an
extension of individual freedom.”).
34. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–48.
35. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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In another view, freedom of expressive association strengthens the
individual voice by placing it into a collective. The collective voice formed
by an expressive association is often more powerful than an individual
voice, warranting even greater protection.36 An expressive association takes
the rights proffered by the First Amendment and amplifies them.37 A lone
protester on the street might be heard by those passing by, but a hoard of
protestors, each communicating a similar message, might be heard not only
from a greater distance, but receive the attention of the various media
outlets. Thus, an expressive association may involve combined or amplified
expression of other protected First Amendment freedoms.38
Though expressive associations receive the full protection of the First
Amendment, there is no absolute right to associate.39 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has developed various tests to determine whether
government interference in a group’s expressive association is permissible,
and has drawn distinctions before selecting a test to apply. Is the association
utilizing a public forum or limited public forum?40 Is the government
withholding a benefit or requiring action?41 Does the state regulation target
the expressive activities of the association or is the regulation neutrally
aimed?42 The interplay between these distinctions is murky and the doctrine
remains nascent.43 But as we explore the murky domain, important points
will be drawn from the cases in which the Court has applied them.

36. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus
between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (“According
protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political
and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”).
37. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
38. Id.
39. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (“The right to associate for expressive purposes is not . . .
absolute.”).
40. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985–86 (2010).
41. See id. at 2986.
42. See id. at 2991–92.
43. See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630–31 (holding that the state demonstrated a compelling
interest in ending gender discrimination, and that the anti-discrimination law was narrowly tailored
to serve that purpose); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000) (holding that the state
did not demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring inclusion of homosexual members into the
local Boy Scout chapter).
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III. DISTINGUISHING BELIEFS
With a broad background in place, we next address the types and
substance of shared beliefs, and the role of these belief types in assessing the
merit of any expressive association. How much, if at all, should the
substance of a group’s shared beliefs matter? Should certain categories or
types of beliefs disqualify a group from First Amendment status as an
expressive association? Should certain ways in which common beliefs or
goals are manifested limit a group’s ability to claim protection? The
answers to these two distinct but often related questions are uncertain in the
decided cases.44
A. Membership and Inclusion
First, should all members of an expressive association be required to
share in a group’s beliefs?45 And should the group’s beliefs be the sole and
determinative criteria for membership, thus foreclosing additional
membership restrictions like gender, race, profession, and the like?46
In the Roberts case, the Court rejected a group’s expressive association
claim, holding that the Jaycees’s qualifying belief—fostering success by
young men in the free market system—was not logically related to the
exclusion of women from the group.47 As Justice Brennan wrote for the
Court, “[A] ‘not insubstantial part’ of the Jaycees activities constitutes
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs.”48
But the Court found “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of
women as full voting members [would] impede the organization’s ability to
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”49
A group’s beliefs and aims, in short, must somehow be related to its
membership criteria.
But why should this be so, especially when the membership standard is
underinclusive, not overinclusive? As long as the members share the
relevant belief, the group would seem to qualify as an “expressive

44. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
45. See Boy Scouts, 630 U.S. at 655–56 (stating that “the First Amendment . . . does not require
that every member of a group agree on every issue,” and noting that it is sufficient if the group
espouses an official position).
46. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (rejecting organization’s claim that “admission of women as
full voting members [would] impede” the organization’s right to full expressive association by
noting that such admission would “[impose] no restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude
individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members” (emphasis
added)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 626 (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983)).
49. Id. at 627.
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association” even if certain types of people—racial groups, women,
academics, people from out of town—are excluded; for the constitutional
value is based on a group’s function, not the particulars of its membership.50
If the point of expressive association is to explore or pursue shared
beliefs, an underinclusive group—in which all members share a belief but
others, who also believe, are not admitted, such as Doctors Against Health
Care Reform—should qualify as an expressive association, notwithstanding
the extra-belief-based membership limit.51 At least, this is so, as long as the
more narrowly defined group is lawful and its narrow definition does not
undermine the group’s aims. By similar logic, we suggest that all those
admitted to membership must in fact share the group’s beliefs and aims, and
do so at a level of generality commensurate with the form and function of
the group and its governance.
B. Judging Beliefs
A second way of looking at the qualifying belief question is to judge the
beliefs themselves and permit only certain beliefs or types of belief to
qualify a group as an expressive association. This approach goes to the
substance of beliefs, not simply their function in group formation and
operation.
One might, for example, see groups like the Jaycees or the Rotary
Club52 as resting on beliefs or forms of belief that do not fully qualify for
First Amendment protection. There are two possible hurdles for groups
pursuing belief-based qualification. The first is that a group’s beliefs
themselves are disqualifying. The second is that the pursuit of the beliefs,
which themselves qualify, is not collective, but individual, and therefore the
“group,” nominally speaking, is not definitionally an expressive association
because it does not employ the group in the pursuit of beliefs or action held
in common.
1. Disqualifying Beliefs as Substantive Limits
In her concurrence to the Court’s Roberts decision, Justice O’Connor
suggested there may be substantive limits on the beliefs of an expressive

50. See id. at 618 (defining expressive association).
51. See id.
52. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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association in order for it to qualify for First Amendment protection.53
Specifically, she suggested that “there is only minimal constitutional
protection of the freedom of commercial association,” a statement that
implies substantive distinctions based on the ideas and actions of certain
kinds of associations.54 As discussed more fully below, we believe that the
import of her statements can best be understood to suggest something about
the nature of the association and its activities, not the type of beliefs that
underlie the association’s activities.55 Our view, in short, focuses more on
the nature of the association’s function than on its substantive beliefs or
goals.56
But the question remains an important one: What would be the basis for
a substantive belief criterion for expressive associations? What about beliefs
and actions in pursuit of free markets, or free competition in certain
commercial markets or industries? Or what about beliefs tied to a specific
product, a particular company, or a particular sales or marketing technique?
One might say, as Justice O’Connor implied by her specific reference to
lower protections for commercial speech, that at some point along this
spectrum of commercial beliefs a line should be drawn.57
But drawing that line, and then justifying its constitutional
disqualification for an association of beliefs and expression, is a daunting
task fraught with free speech problems. Individuals hold an almost limitless
variety of beliefs, and their speech stemming from or expressing those
beliefs is, with the narrowest of exceptions, protected by the First
Amendment.58 Expressive association is simply an instrument of the First
Amendment by which those beliefs can be expressed or explored in common
by a group of like-minded believers.59 To infuse it with more protection
than the free speech principle otherwise requires would be to separate it
from its very roots in free speech.
Yet it is hard to imagine the expressive association First Amendment
label being attached, for example, to Amway,60 or to an investor or
shareholder in a company, or to the employees of a private company or a
public agency.61 Doubtless, many Amway members believe in the

53. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
56. See infra Part IV.
57. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
60. Amway is a multinational direct selling company that sells a variety of products,
predominately in the health, beauty, and home care markets. See Founders’ Fundamentals, AMWAY,
http://www.amway.com/about-amway/our-company/heritage/founders-fundamentals (last visited
Sep. 24, 2012).
61. See id. (explaining that Amway “continue[s] to build on the original values and principles
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company’s mission and purpose, and many shareholders probably believe
fervently in the company in which they invest. Are these beliefs to be
discounted under the First Amendment when pursued by a group of people,
though fully protected under the free speech guarantee? If nothing else, the
Citizens United62 and Sorrell63 decisions suggests that the answer is no,
given that the corporations themselves—Amway among them—possess
robust free speech protection. Thus, while the first aspect—disqualifying
beliefs—is hinted at in some of the cases, and even made explicit in others,64
this seems wrong in the First Amendment setting, where freedom of belief
and expression of belief are at the heart of the guarantee.65 Excluding an
association built around belief in commerce or capitalism, for example,
simply cannot be squared with free speech principles.66
2. Association, Not Expression
But the relationship of beliefs to the association serves an alternative
explanatory function. This inquiry concerns the function of the nominal
group, and disqualifies groups whose activity consists only of individual
pursuit of beliefs or goals by way of the group but not through it; groups in
which, instead, realization of the beliefs and goals is solely the product of
individual action.
There is clear evidence of this group-function view in several cases,
especially in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in the Roberts case.67
In her view, the common belief meriting protection was not a belief shared
by the group as a whole, but a belief held by each individual alone, which
the group facilitated by using the organization as a training or networking

established by [its] founders,” including the values of Freedom, Family, Hope, and Reward).
62. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding “that the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity [because no] sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”).
63. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (finding that “[s]peech in aid of
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment”).
64. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 220, 228–29 (1961).
65. The most famous and still dominant statement of this view was expressed by Justice Holmes
in 1919. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“[I]t is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious[,] or cultural
matters . . . .”).
67. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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facility for each individual member.68 The Jaycees, she claimed,
is, first and foremost, an organization that . . . promotes and
practices the art of solicitation and management. The organization
claims that the training it offers its members gives them an
advantage in business. . . . Jaycee members hone their solicitation
and management skill, under the direction and supervision of the
organization, primarily through their active recruitment of new
members.”69
Like a group that forms momentarily simply by speaking in unison and then
quickly dispersing, there is no reason to see the atomized function of the
Jaycees as serving the expression or achievement of common goals by the
group acting as one.70
The distinction lies in the definitional nature of an association under the
First Amendment, not in the value of a group’s common beliefs.71 Amway
representatives, like shareholders in a corporation, may believe in the
company at many levels, and their investment may advance the company’s
goals—but their association with the company is atomistic, not collective.
Like the Jaycees, as Justice O’Connor described them, shareholders may be
like-minded, but they act as individuals pursuing their own beliefs, not those
of others.72 Their decisions to invest or sell are not instances of collective
action by the group.
An expressive association under the First Amendment is a common
enterprise consisting of expression by and for the group, not the individual
members who can easily enough speak for themselves. The First
Amendment protects their association because of the strength that expression
of a single message by a believing group speaking in concert may possess,
or the internal belief-based satisfaction or succor that sharing beliefs within a
group may yield.73 Amway representatives, in contrast, seek to advance
their own, often common, beliefs and interests through the group, but they
are not interested in the group’s expressive action unless it serves their own
financial interests. They are like football players on a ranked college team:
dependent on each other and on the cohesiveness of the group in athletic
competition, but ultimately concerned about their own success through the
team. Shareholders, no matter how fervent, are similarly interested in their
own economic return, at least within public companies. Nonprofit and

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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charitable corporations or groups are typically different, as the opportunity
for the pursuit of wholly individual and atomistic goals, at least in the sense
of shareholder profit, is largely foreclosed.
The distinction, then, is not the beliefs unifying the individuals but the
nature of the association. It rests upon the means by which belief is
advanced and, most basically, upon the individual group members’
relationship to the group. Protected associations speak as a group for the
group. Whether the group is spiritual, ideological, or commercial makes no
difference. It is the group’s expressive activities that are protected, and the
individual’s part must be subordinated to the collective action and pursuit of
beliefs by the group. This, we think, is the better and sounder way to
understand the Roberts and Rotary Club cases.
Some have seen these cases as reflecting a distinction between
philosophy, ideology, and social action, on the one hand, and commerce and
business on the other.74 Such a distinction would be very hard to manage in
the expressive association setting, and, in any event, the underlying
distinction between commercial speech and fully protected speech is quickly
breaking down in the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence.75 It is
much easier, and much more consistent with the collective expressive action
premise of the expressive association concept, to rest the distinction on a
clear requirement that the association, to qualify, must engage in expression
or action collectively and not simply through the individual action of its
members.76
IV. THE FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGIES OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
At the heart of the expressive association map are the various functional
typologies. As we dissect both the types of associations and the types of
expression, patterns begin to emerge. As a starting point, expression may be

74. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 9, a 1517 (2001) (“Justice O’Connor’s analysis distinguishes
predominantly commercial associations, which do not enjoy full associational protection, from
expressive associations, which do.”).
75. See Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in
the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 231 (2001) (noting that, in the United
States free speech context, “the walls of previously defined categories are breaking down, or being
stretched,” and recognizing that “[p]reviously unprotected categories of speech [like commercial
speech] are now given some degree of protection”).
76. See David P. Gearey, New Protections After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: A Private
University’s First Amendment Right to Pursue Diversity, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1600 (2004)
(collective action is a requirement for expressive association).
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directed inward and meant only to be shared by those within the group.77
Expression may also be projected outward to the public.78 Additionally,
associations may be classified as either heterogeneous or homogeneous in
composition—this heterogeneity may be reflected in both purpose and
form.79 Finally, groups may be classified according to their structure, or
lack thereof.80 Closely related to this question of form is the cohesiveness of
the message that the group projects.81 The sections that follow deal with
these questions of classification. The ideas and typologies suggested are by
no means exhaustive, but provide an important starting point for truly
tackling the questions of what is an expressive association and what are its
constitutional boundaries.
A. Inward and Outward Expression
We turn now to our first functional typology—inward-oriented
expressive activities and outward-oriented action in the form of speech or
other expressive activities. Some associations may be defined solely by
their inward-facing expression. For instance, associations may center
themselves around prayer, group counseling, team-building exercises, or
other self-supporting activities.82 In contrast, other groups engage almost
exclusively in outward expression, invoking activism over silence—a protest
on the capitol steps, a direct-mail campaign, or a series of television
advertisements.83 Yet other groups lie somewhere in between—neither
wholly inward, nor wholly outward, but opting instead for some
combination of the two.84
Thus, this functional typology looks not to the who of the group, but to
the how. In other words, the inward-outward distinction reflects how a
group expresses itself as opposed to who makes up the association.85
Foremost, the distinction analyzes how a group conveys its message—or
messages—and to whom. How a group expresses itself may dictate the
justification for and the level of First Amendment protection granted to the
association.86

77. See infra Part IV.A.1.
78. See infra Part IV.A.2.
79. See infra Part IV.B.
80. See infra Part IV.C.
81. See infra Part IV.C.2.
82. See infra Part IV.A.1.
83. See infra Part IV.A.2.
84. See infra Part IV.A.3.
85. Later typologies will explore the intricacies of group membership, but for now we focus on
the types of expression an association centers itself around.
86. Identifying the specific level of protection that a court should apply to an inward versus
outward group is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, by flushing out the distinctions
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For outward expressive groups and activities, First Amendment claims
will primarily track conventional free speech interests, including access to
fora for speech as well as freedom from impermissible discrimination based
on content.87 In contrast, the interests of inward expressive associations will
reflect the greater importance for their activities of access to places and use
of public property, confidentiality and privacy for individual members and
the collective organization, and freedom in defining goals and the terms of
membership or participation.88
For each association, then, we can ask whether the expression turns
inward or outward or both. Through a study of existing associations, we can
also see the distinction in action, thus providing meaningful insight into the
murky definition of expressive association.
1. Inward Expression
Inward expressive activity is characterized by its boundary within the
group. Group members channel expression within the confines of the
association and for the benefit of the group alone. In such instances,
associations are not trying to enact political change, recruit new members, or
disperse a message outside of the bounds of the group. Instead, where the
expression is inward, the association exists for the benefit of the association
itself.89 Whether to support its members, spur intellectual curiosity, or
continue long-lasting traditions, inward expression serves to strengthen
associations, while espousing ambivalence towards those outside of the
group. This type of expression can take many forms.
a. Counsel and Support
Some associations may exist for and express themselves through
counseling and support services. Members, often sharing common struggles

between these types of groups, the First Amendment values worthy of protection become much
clearer.
87. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984–86 (2010) (applying public forum analysis to the Christian Legal
Society’s expressive association claim).
88. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958).
89. This is not to say that once a group exercises inward expression it ceases to exist for the
benefit of outsiders. As discussed at the beginning of this section, many groups are neither wholly
inward nor wholly outward. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A.3.
Thus, where a group falls somewhere between the ends of the spectrum, only its inward expression
is solely for the benefit of the group.
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or pain, share those experiences with one another in a safe and comforting
environment. For instance, Alcoholics Anonymous—an organization for
recovering alcoholics—describes itself as a “fellowship of men and women
who share their experience, strength and hope with each other that they may
solve their common problem and help others to recover from alcoholism.”90
Further, Alcoholics Anonymous prides itself on its inner-organizational
focus and disclaims outward allegiances.91 As its informational statement
describes, “AA is not allied with any sect, denomination, politics,
organization or institution; does not wish to engage in any controversy,
neither endorses nor opposes any causes.”92 This policy statement makes
clear that Alcoholics Anonymous exists solely for the benefit of its
members, expressing itself inwardly through counseling and recovery
services.93
b. Ritual and Secrecy
For other groups, inward expression is defined not just by its boundary
within the group, but also by its exclusivity. For these groups, certain
information and knowledge is available only to those within the group and
otherwise kept strictly confidential. One such group cloaked in secrecy is
the Skull and Bones—a society for select undergraduate seniors at Yale
University.94 Little is known about this student organization, but much
speculation surrounds its secret rituals and prominent list of members.95 As
another example, Scientologists require membership—and a series of
donations—as a prerequisite to learning about and experiencing many of the
group’s religious and philosophical beliefs.96 These groups not only direct
their expression inward, but they also seek to prevent outsiders from having
access to this expression.

90. Information on A.A., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, http://www.aa.org/subpage.cfm?page=1
(last visited Sep. 25, 2012).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Judith Ann Schiff, How the Secret Societies Got that Way, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Sep.–Oct.
2004, http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2004_09/old_yale.html.
95. Id.; see also Molly Ball & Emily Bell, Behind the Walls of Yale’s Secret Societies, YALE
HERALD ONLINE, http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/frosh/1998/blue/secret.html (last visited Sep.
25, 2012).
96. See Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 50
(“Today the church invents costly new services with all the zeal of its founder. Scientology doctrine
warns that even adherents who are ‘cleared’ of engrams face grave spiritual dangers unless they are
pushed to higher and more expensive levels.”).
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c. Study and Intellectual Growth
Yet other groups express themselves inwardly to foster intellectual
discussion and advance their respective studies. For instance, Mensa prides
itself on only admitting members whose “IQ is in the top 2% of the
population.”97 One of its primary goals is to “promote stimulating
intellectual and social opportunities for its members.”98 Like Alcoholics
Anonymous, Mensa seeks to disassociate itself from beliefs outside of its
primary aim, disclaiming any purpose beyond the fostering of intelligence
by taking “no stand on politics, religion or social issues.”99
d. Bonding and Training
Finally, many associations form so that members can bond together
through a common mentoring, educational, or training goal. These groups
include such organizations as the Girl Scouts,100 4-H clubs,101 and the
National FFA Organization.102 The Boy Scouts of America also fit this
form—bonding together and educating young men.103 The Boy Scouts
mission is to “provide[] a program for young people that builds character,
trains them in the responsibilities of participating citizenship, and develops
personal fitness.”104 The Boy Scouts rally around certain values known as
“Scout Law.”105 Indeed, all scouts aspire to be trustworthy, loyal, helpful,
friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and

97. About Mensa International, MENSA INT’L, http://www.mensa.org/about-us (last visited Sep.
25, 2012).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Who We Are: Facts, GIRL SCOUTS, http://www.girlscouts.org/who_we_are/facts/ (last
visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“Girl Scouting builds girls of courage, confidence, and character, who make
the world a better place.”).
101. See Who We Are, 4-H, http://www.4-h.org/about/youth-development-organization/ (last
visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“[T]he 4-H movement supports young people from elementary school
through high school with programs designed to shape future leaders and innovators.”).
102. See Who We Are: Mission and Motto, NAT’L FFA ORG., https://www.ffa.org/about/
whoweare/Pages/MissionandMotto.aspx (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“The National FFA
Organization is dedicated to making a positive difference in the lives of students by developing their
potential for premier leadership, personal growth and career success through agricultural
education.”).
103. See About the BSA, BOY SCOUTS OF AM., http://www.scouting.org/About.aspx (last visited
Sep. 25, 2012).
104. Id.
105. Visitor: What Are the Scout Oath and Scout Law?, BOY SCOUTS OF AM.,
http://www.scouting.org/FAQ/Visitor.aspx (last visited Sep. 25, 2012).

39

BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/2013 12:54 PM

reverent.106
The Supreme Court addressed the nature of the Boy Scouts expression
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.107 In Dale, the Court considered whether
the inclusion of an “unwanted member”—in this instance, a homosexual
scoutmaster—impermissibly “infringe[d] the group’s freedom of expressive
association . . . [by affecting] in a significant way the group’s ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints.”108 The Court found that the general
mission of the Boy Scouts was to instill values in its young members, and
accepted the Boy Scouts’s assertion that homosexuality was at odds with the
Scout Oath and Law, which sets forth those general value principles.109
Deferring to the association’s view of what would “impair its expression,”
the Court held that the forced inclusion of a homosexual scoutmaster would
impermissibly interfere with the Boy Scouts’s right to expressive
association.110 The Court provided this protection to the Boy Scouts despite
the fact that it did not “associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief
Indeed, the Court seemed to
that homosexuality is immoral.”111
acknowledge and protect the inward-oriented nature of the Boy Scouts,
holding that “associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of
the First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive
activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”112
2. Outward Expression
At the other end of the expressive association spectrum are groups
exhibiting outward expression. Quite the opposite of inward expression,
outward expression goes well beyond the boundaries of the association
itself. Groups wishing to express themselves outwardly must reach out to
nonmembers in a notable way. This outreach can take many forms.
a. Charitable
Some groups—most obviously nonprofit organizations—organize
themselves around charitable pursuits. These associations seek to help those

106. Id.
107. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
108. Id. at 648 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 650.
110. Id. at 653 (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its
expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its
expression.”).
111. Id. at 654 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. at 655.
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outside of the group through philanthropic endeavors. Included in this form
are the Knights of Columbus—a male-only Catholic organization dedicated
to charity.113 The Knights of Columbus’s “charitable activities encompass
an almost infinite variety of local, national and international projects.”114
Another example includes the United Way, which seeks to “advance the
common good and mobilize the caring power of communities around the
world” by “ignit[ing] a worldwide social movement, and thereby
mobiliz[ing] millions to action—to give, advocate and volunteer to improve
the conditions in which they live.”115 Charitable associations such as these
express themselves outwardly through service to others.
b. Political
Political groups represent another outward-oriented paradigm. Obvious
examples include political parties, but this classification also covers smaller,
activist-based groups. For instance the Federalist Society, “a group of
conservatives and libertarians interested in the current state of the legal
order,” organizes around a shared belief that the judiciary should take a
textually and historically limiting approach to interpreting laws and the
Constitution, and “seeks both to promote an awareness of these principles
and to further their application through its activities.”116 Another example
includes Students for a Democratic Society, which describes itself as “a
radical, multi-issue student and youth organization working to build power
in our schools and communities.”117 Political groups exist to advocate
beliefs to the public, and so could not exist without an outlet for outward
expression.
c. Issue-Based
Sharing many similarities and often overlapping with political groups,

113. See Activities, KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS, http://www.kofc.org/un/en/about/activities/
index.html (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“From the moment of our founding in 1882, charity has been
the first principle of the Knights of Columbus. We are men of faith and men of action.”).
114. Id.
115. About United Way Worldwide, UNITED WAY, http://www.unitedway.org/pages/about-unitedway-worldwide/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012).
116. About Us, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW AND PUB. POLICY STUDIES, http://www.fedsoc.org/aboutus/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012).
117. About Us, STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOC’Y, http://www.newsds.org/about-us (last
visited Sep. 25, 2012). In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171–80 (1972), the Supreme Court
addressed Students for a Democratic Society and its role as an expressive association.

41

BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/2013 12:54 PM

issue-based groups organize around a single issue and advocate on behalf of
that issue. For instance, the National Rifle Association seeks to preserve the
Second Amendment and individual gun ownership rights.118 It describes its
four million members as “among history’s most committed, most active and
most politically savvy defenders of the fundamental freedom.”119 Another
issue-based group is the NAACP—a group dedicated to preserving and
enhancing the civil rights of Americans.120 These issue-based groups strive
to raise awareness of their central issues and to convince outsiders to adhere
to the group’s message.
3. Falling Along the Spectrum: A Case Study in Religious
Organizations
As noted above, few groups can be classified as wholly outward or
wholly inward.121 Even those groups nearing one end of the spectrum may,
at times, engage in group activity outside of their norms. Thus, it is more
important to classify the type of expression than the type of group. In other
words, a group’s inward expression raises different constitutional questions
than a group’s outward expression. An apt illustration of this arises when
analyzing religious groups. For instance, a self-identified Baptist engages in
different expression within the confines of a Bible study than if she hands
out Bibles on the street corner.122
Moreover, not only might the expression be different, but the
constitutional provisions triggered will often be different—namely, freedom
of speech or the Free Exercise Clause.123 For instance, few would question

118. See Wayne LaPierre, LaPierre: NRA Has Never Backed Down, HUMAN EVENTS (Feb. 14,
2012, 7:45 AM) http:///www.humanevents.com/2012/02/14/lapierre-nra-has-never-backed-down/
1345271130000/.
119. Id.
120. See Welcome to the NAACP, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012)
(“[T]he NAACP is the nation’s oldest and largest civil rights organization. From the ballot box to
the classroom, the thousands of dedicated workers, organizers, leaders and members who make up
the NAACP continue to fight for social justice for all Americans.”).
The NAACP triggered the Court’s expressive association jurisprudence. In NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958), the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
NAACP to not reveal the names and addresses of its members to the states, holding that such a
revelation would violate the group’s expressive association rights, curtailing the group’s ability to
advocate its beliefs.
121. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
122. Though the case did not dive into the religion clauses, the Westboro Baptist Church
described in Snyder v. Phelps provides an example of the types of outward expression associated
with a religion-centered expressive association. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011)
(“The church frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military funerals. In the more
than 20 years that the members of Westboro Baptist have publicized their message, they have
picketed nearly 600 funerals.”).
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
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that the Free Exercise Clause protects the right of evangelicals to join
together in a morning church service, espousing whatever beliefs they
choose and excluding whomever they choose. However, whether the Free
Exercise Clause protects the right of evangelical students to exclude
members from their public-funded student organization is a much murkier
question and perhaps one better dealt with in the expressive association
context.124 This switch from an evangelical in a church to an evangelical in
a student organization also reflects a shift in expression. The closely knit
community of a church calls for much inward expression, while a student
organization incorporates outward expression.
An example is provided by the Christian Legal Society (CLS), a
religious-academic student organization.125 The Supreme Court specifically
dealt with the nature of its expression in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez.126 CLS is a national religious organization centered around
Christian beliefs which describes its mission as follows:
(1) to build communities of Christian law students who glorify God
in their lives, their schools, and their profession, and (2) to nurture
and encourage Christian law students by providing mentors and
resources aimed at fostering spiritual growth, compassionate
outreach, and the integration of faith and practice.127
Additionally, CLS requires all members, as a condition of membership,
to sign a “Statement of Faith.”128 Most controversial for purposes of the
case, CLS interpreted the Statement of Faith to mean that “unrepentant
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent
with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, and consequently may be
regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). See generally Scott M. Noveck, The
Promise and Problems of Treating Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L. REV.
75 (providing in depth discussion of merits of analyzing religion under the free exercise clause
versus as an expressive association).
124. See generally Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
125. See About Us, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=327 (last
visited Sep. 25, 2012) [hereinafter About CLS].
126. 130 S. Ct. 2971.
127. What is Christian Legal Society? Law Student Ministries, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y,
http://www.clsnet.org/pages/law-students/chapter-manual-what-is-cls? (last visited Sep. 25, 2012).
128. Statement of Faith, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=367
(last visited Sep. 25, 2012).
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membership.”129 Sexually immoral conduct was defined to “include[]
engaging in ‘acts of sexual conduct outside of God’s design for marriage
between one man and one woman[,]’” which acts include fornication,
adultery, and homosexual conduct.130 Thus, by choosing not to associate
with those unwilling to sign the Statement of Faith, CLS ran afoul of the law
school’s nondiscrimination policy.131
The case pitted a religious-student organization—claiming the right to
associate only with members who ascribe to its principles of faith—against a
law school, claiming the right to cut off funding to any student group whose
membership excluded others based on “status or belief.”132 The case called
upon the Court to weigh CLS’s right to associate with members of its own
choosing, CLS’s evangelizing in the law school environment, and the law
school’s interest in maintaining an academic environment that was inclusive
of all students.133
Unlike individuals attending a church service or Bible study, members
of CLS consist of law students who affiliate with the group as an extension
of their academic study.134 The association’s expression is not wholly
inward—as an intimate church service may be—but, instead, involves
spreading a message and interacting with those outside of the group.135
CLS, then, as a religious-academic organization, is clearly an expressive
association, but less clearly a group demanding the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause. Therefore, where religious groups, such as CLS or the
Knights of Columbus, express themselves outwardly, protections may be
better analyzed under the right to expressive association than the Free
Exercise Clause.136 If instead, CLS were a private religious organization
communicating mostly within the confines of the group, the Free Exercise
Clause provides a more exacting fit.137 The Supreme Court seemed to agree,
analyzing only CLS’s expressive association claims rather than free exercise

129. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3001.
130. Id. (quoting Running a Student Chapter: CLS Community Life Statement, CHRISTIAN LEGAL
SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/pages/law-students/chapter-manual-running-a-chapter? (last visited
Sep. 25, 2012)).
131. Id. at 2980.
132. Id. at 2979.
133. Id. at 2978.
134. See, Running a Student Chapter, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/pages/
law-students/chapter-manual-running-a-chapter? (last visited Sep. 25, 2012).
135. For instance, CLS prides itself on its legal aid clinics. Legal Aid Ministries, CHRISTIAN
LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=429 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (“Since 2000,
thousands of CLS members have donated hundreds of thousands of legal service hours to helping the
disadvantaged untangle debilitating legal issues, seek Christian guidance for personal problems, and
understand their rights under the law so they can lead more productive lives.”).
136. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2975.
137. See id. at 2979.
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claims.138
Beyond the threshold question of which guarantee—freedom of religion
or freedom of speech—dominates the analysis, expressive associational
principles may also shape the constitutional protection to applicable First
Amendment values. Inward expression serves different values and ends than
outward expression, which is more dominantly mechanical and focused on
amplification of individuals’ speech.139 Between these two types, the
strength of scrutiny may appropriately be distinct. It is not our purpose to
develop those differences, but the structure we provide here is a starting
point.
B. Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Associations
Beyond classifying the nature of a group’s expression, expressive
associations may also be classified according to the conformity of the
group’s composition and purpose—whether it be homogeneous or
heterogeneous. The classic form of expressive association recognized by the
Supreme Court consists of a homogeneous and largely single purpose group
like the NAACP or the Sons of Liberty.140 But the composition of many
expressive associations is more complex than these, and one of the axes of
complexity concerns the heterogeneity that a qualifying group might
contain. There are two types of heterogeneity that concern us in this Part:
heterogeneity in composition and purpose and heterogeneity in the form of
the group. Both attributes, as we will see, are best understood as intimately
connected.141 We will later deal separately with heterogeneity in the
organizational composition of membership, which we will call the
conglomerate question.142
1. Beliefs and Aims
In this part we focus on the glue—beliefs and common interests—that

138. CLS argued that the law school’s nondiscrimination policy violated both their free exercise
rights and their right to an expressive association. Id. at 2979. In the end, the Court upheld the law
school’s nondiscrimination policy through a novel application of forum analysis to its expressive
association jurisprudence, holding that the law school’s policy was viewpoint neutral and a
reasonable regulation. Id. at 2993–94.
139. See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
140. An instructive history and discussion can be found in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 925–26 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. See infra Part IV.B.3.a–b.
142. See infra Part IV.C.2.c.
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binds the group. As a general matter, we are not concerned with diversity of
membership, as such, or even different views and attitudes on matters of
politics, socioeconomic status, or the like. These are simply different
backgrounds against which common affiliations typically exist. Instead we
are concerned with the relationship between a group’s common aims or
beliefs and the affiliation of members, otherwise diverse or not, in the group.
Without some common core of aims or beliefs, the very idea of expressive
association would be meaningless.143
Common aims or beliefs must therefore be ascertainable as a
definitional prerequisite to protection under the First Amendment.144 Those
aims and beliefs must be ascertainable at some level of concreteness, and
adherence to them by the group must be governable and governed within the
group.145 If there is no governing control of the common purposes to be
pursued by the group, there is no reason to treat the collection of individuals
or members as an expressive association.146 For example, if a group focused
on economic issues takes a position on a matter of religion unrelated to the
group’s economic aims, then the high degree of heterogeneity in the
common aims and purposes of the group should disqualify its action as an
instance of expressive association, and may even lead to the conclusion that
the group’s governance toward its aims has been fatally undermined by the
unilateral action in the face of the group’s expressive aims.
But group aims and purposes may be broad and quite diverse, within
limits. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for example, has a
stated commitment to expression and action in defense of civil rights.147
Such a broad set of common aims and purposes can involve many specific
actions and policy positions with which the members of the group disagree,
perhaps strenuously.148 Whether such disagreement is disqualifying is a
function of the breadth and heterogeneity of the aims and purposes
themselves. It is also a function of the range of actions the group has
delegated to the governing authority in the group. The League of Women
Voters has general aims as a national organization, but members of the
group also subscribe to a governance structure under which many of its
constituent chapters reach their own policy positions, and individual

143. See supra note 24–29 and accompanying text (defining the concept of expressive
association).
144. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621–22 (1984).
145. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653–56 (2000).
146. See supra note 24–29 and accompanying text.
147. See About the ACLU, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012)
(stating the broad panoply of rights the ACLU seeks to protect, including First Amendment rights,
equal protection rights, due process rights, and privacy rights).
148. E.g., John de J. Pemberton, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Dissension in the ACLU, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sep. 14, 1967, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1967/sep/14/dissension-in-theaclu/.
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members do not condition their affiliation on specific personal agreement
with any particular decision made as long as it is pursuant to processes of
judgment and decision to which a member must knowingly subscribe.149
Thus, the First Amendment may protect these diverse groups’ right of
expressive association so long as a diverse array of purposes is made a
hallmark of the organization and such purposes are defined. These
heterogeneous groups touch on more traditional First Amendment interests
of speech and the members use the group as a means to amplify their
message.
2. Form and Structure of Groups
The heterogeneity inquiry thus inevitably must focus heavily on the
form of the group, not just any single instance of collective action. Whether
a band of people who casually congregate in common cause, only to disband
after a brief moment in time, constitutes an expressive association for
purposes of the First Amendment, as opposed to a set of individual speakers
with a very specific and momentary agreement, is an open question. But it
does seem clear that something more formal and lasting (even briefly) goes
to the heart of the constitutional values that underlie the First Amendment
expressive association label.150 Momentary agreement, like singing in
unison, should be seen as the speech of each individual singer, with respect
to which the First Amendment provides full and ample protection.
Something more lasting, however, may trigger other protections such as the
right to association.
It is thus on questions not only of substance of belief but also of nontransitory form of a group or association that we will focus in our discussion
of heterogeneity and expressive association. Form, as we will use the term,
includes not just the composition of the membership of a group, but more
importantly whether the group has a formal, recognized identity, a
governance structure, and a set of aims and purposes to which the individual
members subscribe—or, at least, consent—and a duration. Furthermore, we
will ask whether the aims and purposes represent a common core of
individual member belief or commitment, and whether and how the
members themselves participate in a governance fashion with those who
govern the group, at least to a sufficient degree such that the group’s

149. See About the League, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, http://www.lwv.org/content/about-us
(last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
150. Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621–22 (1984).
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collective actions can be said to reflect the aims and purposes of the
individual members, who are the First Amendment speakers in fact. As the
question might be put in corporate terms: is there a clear separation between
ownership and management, and what sorts of duties of allegiance to the
common aims and purposes of the members or owners does the management
have?
As an extension of the heterogeneity question we will look to the formal
nature of the group. Is its expressive activity inward-directed only, or
outward-oriented, as with public speech? It is likely, perhaps, that the
heterogeneity of beliefs and aims regarding those beliefs will be greater with
inward-directed groups, which might assemble, as did the famous
Metaphysical Club,151 in order to discuss, study, or explore a broad or
limitless set of beliefs or ideas. In contrast, an outward-oriented group
engaged purposely in expressing views outside its membership would seem
ill-suited under the Supreme Court’s rationale for expressive association
protection if its aims were intellectually global and its positions wholly
undetermined.
3. Business Corporations as Expressive Associations
As an illustration of the heterogeneity question, we turn to the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
holding that, at least with respect to political speech, corporations qualify as
fully protected speakers under the First Amendment.152 In the words of the
Court:
[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection
“simply because its source is a corporation. . . .” The Court has thus
rejected the argument that political speech of a corporation or other
associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not “natural
persons.”153
And, the Court adds, a corporation’s speech is protected by the First
Amendment “even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons
or entities who disagree with the [corporation’s] ideas.”154 That is, it does
not matter for First Amendment purposes that the shareholders and
investors, for example, disagree with the corporation’s speech.155 While

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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See generally Louis Menand, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2002).
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
Id. at 900 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 784 (1978)).
Id. at 905.
See id.
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Citizens United deals only, at least explicitly, with the speech questions, it
may have far-reaching implications for the rights of expressive associations.
In light of Citizens United, how are corporations to be treated in the
expressive association context? Corporations are now fully protected
speakers equivalent in First Amendment rights to individuals, at least with
respect to political speech.156 But they are also organizations consisting of
members. The NAACP, the Boy Scouts, and religious groups, to name but a
few, have speech rights, but they are also protected expressive
associations.157 Many, like the ACLU, have corporate members and receive
significant corporate support.158 The protection such associations enjoy
serves their members’ expressive freedom and the organizations’ capacity to
act on it through speech by the organization. The fact that under Citizens
United corporations are themselves, as organizations, speakers, even in the
absence of agreement by shareholders or members, does not itself foreclose
the corporation also being protected as an expressive association.
Nonetheless, the right to speak and the right to expressive association
are two distinct issues.159 Being an entity with freedom to speak does not in
itself mean that the entity is an expressive association.160 The Court has held
that the Jaycees and Rotary Club do not enjoy the freedom granted
qualifying expressive associations.161 Something else pertaining to beliefs,
qualifications for membership, and the types of expressive commitments or
activities, whether kept within the group or channeled outward, is needed to
qualify an association as an expressive association speaking or existing on
behalf of the members’ own expressive interests.162
Has Citizens United changed all of that? To explore this question we
must first consider the various forms of corporation or group enterprise and
the distinct purposes and functions they serve—in other words, the
heterogeneity of corporations. Citizens United was an ideological corporate
organization dedicated to speaking on behalf of known political interests and

156. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
157. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648–53 (2000); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958).
158. See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; see also David E. Bernstein,
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 90 (2001).
159. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913, with Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648–53.
160. Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
161. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
162. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622–23; Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 545–48.
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beliefs.163 But this is far from true with most corporations and their
organizational kin.
There are many forms of corporation: profit; nonprofit; charitable;
Subchapter-S; joint ventures; as well as other non-corporate organizations
that share the qualities of corporations: limited partnerships; partnerships;
alliances of various kinds; etc.164 Of equal importance, there are many types
of corporations in terms of their objects, missions, and activities: charitable;
religious; and social service.165 And of course there are the dominant special
purpose corporations that we call “business corporations.”166
It is to the business corporations that Citizens United was addressed,167
and we will principally focus on how these corporations act as expressive
associtations, specifically, their activities and policies, and their members’
rights of affiliation and association within the organization. Business
corporations and organizations are entities whose primary activity is to
conduct business—selling, serving, buying, transacting—for the overriding
purpose of making profit and maximizing economic value and return to
shareholders.168 Of equal importance, they are also organizations marked by
a formal legal separation between management and ownership, a feature that
is most pronounced with publicly held corporations.169
Most business corporations have protection under the First Amendment
for the necessary business speech in which they engage—like advertising,
defending their commercial interests in the marketplace, and the like.170
Their protection under the First Amendment, according to the Supreme
Court, is for “commercial speech.”171 Two things are important to note in
relation to commercial speech. First, the protection is accorded to the
speech—or commercial information communicated—not to the act of

163. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87.
164. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Joint Venture Distinguished From Other Relationships, in 46 AM.
JUR. 2d Joint Ventures § 5 (2012).
165. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, Classifications and Kinds of Corporations: Charitable and
Benevolent Corporations, in 1A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS. § 79
(2012).
166. See Eclavea, supra note 164.
167. Ironically, however, Citizens United was clearly an ideological and belief-based corporation
whose mission was to engage in public communication. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 922–24. The
Court, however, treated this fact as irrelevant—indeed essentially rejected its significance—by
rejecting the government’s argument that was very much premised on this fact. Id.
168. See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primary, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 533 (2006).
169. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 6 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968).
170. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759–
61 (1976).
171. Id. at 758–61.
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speaking as such, whether by an ad agency or the corporation itself.172
Second, the First Amendment primarily protects the public as consumers for
whom the information is valuable in a market economy.173 In these respects,
the kind of First Amendment protection against government regulation of
commercial speech is (1) weaker than that accorded speech by an individual,
(2) qualified in part by the acknowledged ability of government to regulate
such speech to assure that it is accurate and non-deceptive, and (3) leaves
government more room for regulatory decisions than would be available for
regulation of individual speech under the strict scrutiny test.174
Reasonableness is instead the standard.175
Outside of the commercial speech arena, business corporation speech
receives much the same protection as individual speech, at least with respect
to political speech.176 The political speech boundary is very ambiguous.
The Court in Citizens United addressed only business corporation support of
and engagement in independent expenditures related to political campaigns,
but it used the political speech descriptor in stating its broad holding.177 As a
result, and if prior experience with political or public issue boundaries in
other First Amendment settings is any indication,178 the political speech
boundary of Citizens United will be greatly broadened in future cases, and
the Court may well ultimately conclude that all non-commercial speech by
corporations is fully protected.
This is the landscape against which the business-corporation-asexpressive-association issue exists. Our first question is what effect Citizens
United will have on corporate shareholders’ claims that they are an
expressive association even though their speech is animated by commercial
purposes. We can identify three principal effects of such a claim of
expressive association status, if successful:
1. The Jaycees179 and Rotary180 cases, which rested on the less

172. Id.
173. Id. at 756–57.
174. Cecil C. Kuhne, Testing the Outer Limits of Commercial Speech: Its First Amendment
Implications, 23 REV. LITIG. 607, 613–14 (2004).
175. Ann K. Wooster, Protection of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment—Supreme
Court Cases, in 164 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2000).
176. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 951 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
177. Id. at 900 (majority opinion).
178. E.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974) (abandoning as ungovernable the earlier
matter of public concern standard).
179. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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valuable nature of personal business interests to deny protection,181
will be undermined. Business entities should now be eligible for
protection as First Amendment expressive associations whose
speech is, at least on political matters related to business interests,
fully protected, and whose membership and other practices,
including nondisclosure, might be protected from state regulation
under the First Amendment.
2. Government regulations of business membership practices
should be subjected to strict scrutiny. These regulations might
include anti-discrimination laws as well as expression-related
restrictions by the SEC, or EPA, or product safety agencies, and so
on.
3. Membership and other disclosure requirements (political
contributions and expenditures) will be subject to strict scrutiny if
the organization or its members assert that their membership
(including stock purchase) would be inhibited by the prospect of
lost privacy in political, social, and economic beliefs and
affiliations.182
Whether business corporations qualify as expressive associations after
Citizens United, however, is a distinct question from whether such
corporations themselves, independent of the members, have free speech
rights.
Expressive association law under the First Amendment has been
premised from the start on the protection of certain types of associations and
on certain subjects, in order that disclosure not inhibit the members of
associations from engaging in group formation in areas important to
individual liberty—like religion, politics, and ideology, and social,
economic, and cultural beliefs and interests—nor inhibit the associations’
expression on behalf of the members.183 Such group formations foster
individual belief within the group and strengthened expression in the public
arena on behalf of the group and its beliefs.184
Protection for such expressive associations has also afforded the
members of such groups privacy from unwanted public disclosure, on the
theory that the choice of group formation and association may be chilled by

180. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
181. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
182. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458–60 (1958) (applying this
principle to shield the NAACP from having to disclose its membership lists).
183. See Farber, supra note 9, at 1488 n.31.
184. See id. at 1484 nn.5–6.
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public disclosure of the individual’s membership.185 Members may be
inhibited by the loss of privacy in their thoughts and beliefs, the impact on
friendships, jobs, and security that might result from shunning, or retaliation
by other persons or groups, both private and governmental.186
In light of Citizens United, are there any possible grounds upon which a
business corporation can and should be excluded from the category of
expressive associations? Arguably, shareholders of a business corporation
are in a position to protect their own privacy by simply selling their shares
on the market. The relationship with the corporation, in other words, is not
permanent enough to warrant general First Amendment protection. This has
never been a very persuasive rationale, in large part because selling shares is
arguably harder and more costly than simply terminating membership in
another form of organization. One can cancel membership in the ACLU or
NRA more easily and cheaply than selling one’s shares in IBM.
The distinction between the ACLU and IBM rests rather on a value
judgment that beliefs about civil rights are more central under the First
Amendment than beliefs about commerce.187 But granting full free speech
rights to business corporations and their expression places this distinction in
considerable doubt.188 If the corporation’s speech is fully protected, then it
must be as important as religious, ideological, and governance interests
(such as civil rights).189 The purely self-interested commercial element
exists on the side in the commercial speech doctrine—in the field of
advertising for the buying or selling of products alone—where, ironically,
there likely is broad agreement with the messages on the part of the
shareholders/members.
Should group affiliation and action in support of the profit aims of a
business corporation in the commercial market be enough for expressive
association qualification? As to such values and purposes as commercial
success, deregulation, honesty in conduct, skill in pricing, originality, and
business success in a capitalistic market, it is hard in light of Citizens United
to deny the corporation and its shareholders/members protection under the
expressive association umbrella.190 As the Court said in Citizens United,

185. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
186. Id.
187. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
188. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“The First Amendment does not
permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker
and the content of the political speech.”).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 913.
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these and related business matters and interests are critically important to the
public in the marketplace of ideas.191
Do sufficiently coherent common values exist among shareholders of
business corporations to justify expressive association status? Or, put
differently, outside of the commercial speech context, are there sufficient
shared beliefs and convictions on matters of public policy among the
corporate membership to support a constitutional right of the corporation to
speak on behalf of the members, and thus for the members to claim
constitutional protection for their affiliation with the corporation? Where do
business corporations fall on the heterogeneous to homogeneous spectrum?
This was an issue left unexplored in Citizens United. But there are two
possible approaches to its answer—both leading to the conclusion that a
business corporation is not an expressive association.
a. Horizontal Heterogeneity
One might argue that the common values among IBM shareholders are
no less consistent than the common values of ACLU members. The ACLU
takes many positions, nationally and locally, and engages in a broad range of
specific litigation, lobbying, and political persuasion.192 Individual members
often, indeed regularly, disagree strongly with some or many of the positions
the ACLU takes.193 But they are united in the importance of civil liberties
and the watchdog role the organization plays in the system.194 This is
arguably no different than the IBM shareholder, who may disagree with
many of IBM’s corporate and expressive choices, but who believes strongly
in the private ownership of property and the free enterprise system, as well
as in IBM’s success in that system. Absent a distinction between economic
and political interests, it seems difficult if not impossible to justify treating
the ACLU and IBM differently. More importantly, the Citizens United court
rejected any such distinction in open and forceful language.195
But, for expressive associations, the question is not the presence or
substance of a common interest, like selling Chevys, but instead the
individual shareholder’s relation to the interest as one to be accomplished for
them as individuals through the corporation’s expressive acts. For the
ordinary publicly-held business corporation, the shareholder’s interest
cannot be described in this way. The shareholder may love Chevys quite

191. See id.
192. ACLU, supra note 147.
193. See Pemberton, supra note 148.
194. See ACLU, supra note 147.
195. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make
these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the
political speech.”).
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apart from GM’s success. As an investor in GM, the shareholder’s interest
is entirely individual and atomistic: value and return on investment. The
shareholder is much like the member of Jaycees, whose stake is not the
organization’s expression of their philosophy, but instead its valuable
experience and training in the art of marketing and public relations, which
benefits the member individually and not in a collective expressive way.196
b. Vertical Heterogeneity
The second argument is that common interests and shared beliefs are
simply not relevant under the First Amendment after Citizens United. If the
business corporation (independent of its shareholders or members) has its
own speech rights, the need for common interests and beliefs on the part of
shareholders and members has been necessarily eliminated, and therefore the
same result must hold for any expressive association claim. The expressive
association right, it should be recalled, is necessarily premised on a First
Amendment speech right: either by the individual member rights-holders for
whom the corporation speaks, ventriloquist-like; or by the corporate entity
itself that speaks for its members, even if they agree or intend not to speak
through their ownership.197 It is the latter model that Citizens United quite
explicitly adopted, not to the exclusion of the first model, but alongside it
and, indeed, often absorbing it.198
In the end, however, there is a seemingly insuperable obstacle to treating
the conventional business corporation as an expressive association. In those
corporations (or, for that matter, other forms of organization) that practice
the legal separation of management and shareholders, the associational
quality of the speaker is fatally undermined, for the association members are
insufficiently connected to the speech communicated by the association for
the members.199

196. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1984) (“The objective of the Jaycees, as
set out in its bylaws, is to pursue ‘such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and
foster the growth and development of young men’s civic organizations in the United States, designed
to inculcate in the individual membership of such organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and
civic interest, and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in
the affairs of the community, state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding
among young men of all nations.’”).
197. See generally id.; Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 891–917.
198. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–908.
199. Cf. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 169, at 6 (generally discussing the business implications of
the separation of ownership and control in a corporation).
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The purpose of an expressive association is to serve the beliefs and
goals of the members individually.200 In an outward-focused association,
this means that the organized group’s expression must be closely tailored to
the beliefs and expressive intentions of the members or shareholders, and
those who manage the speech by the organization must be closely tethered to
the intentions of the membership.201 This implies a relationship between
owners and managers that is quite distinct from the discretion afforded
officers in a business corporation, who make decisions for the corporation as
a separate enterprise.202 Those values are structural and not specific for the
individual shareholders; they are part of the transactional terms when shares
are purchased.203 They do not take individualized, belief-based, shape—
other than in the atomized investment purposes of each individual
shareholder.204 They do not, in other words, qualify as beliefs and aims of
the individual for the group (corporation) that reflects them.
Is this conclusion different in the context of a small, privately-owned or
even individually-owned business? It appears not to be. For the small
business with limited owners, the aims and organization of the business are
not analytically distinct for expressive association purposes.205 The
businesses are most often run just like a larger corporation: they are
managed for profit and value, and decisions are made by management for
the benefit of the business entity and its success, not for and on behalf of the
expressive needs of a group.206 The investor/shareholder/partner interests
are individualized and economic—atomized at the individual level.207 Most
such organizations, unless they are structured around a set of non-business
beliefs and goals that determine the group’s actions, are both horizontally
and vertically heterogeneous.
A different analysis applies to the business owned by one individual—
the sole proprietor or private corporation model. In such cases, the business
is the alter ego of the owning individual or, perhaps, family.208 It may
pursue expressive ends dictated by the owner. But it would not do so,

200. See Christian A. Malanga, Expressive Association—Student Organizations’ Right to
Discriminate: A Look at Public Schools’ Nondiscrimination Policies and Their Application to
Christian Legal Society Student Chapters, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 759 (2007).
201. See supra Part IV.A.2.
202. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 169, at 6.
203. Cf. id.
204. Cf. id.
205. See What Is SBA’s Definition of a Small Business Concern?, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-sbas-definition-small-business-concern (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
206. See id. (defining a small business as a business “that is independently owned and operated, is
organized for profit, and is not dominant in its field”).
207. Cf. id.
208. Raymond T. Nimmer, Sole Proprietorships, in 1 COMMERCIAL ASSET-BASED FINANCING §
2:6 (2012).
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generally, as an association or group, but instead as an individual who, of
course, has a full measure of free speech rights to be exercised through the
corporation or business. It would not be an expressive association, however,
simply but fundamentally because it is not a group, but an individual who
owns and controls it.209
For these reasons, in the modern business corporation, the associational
claim should not be recognized at all. The association—for that is truly
what most corporations (and their kin) are—is simply too heterogeneous to
qualify as an expressive association under the First Amendment.
C. Form and Formless Associations
Our final typology in this mapping exercise explores the form of
expressive associations.
1. The Strange Case of Doe v. Reed210
We begin our exploration of form in expressive associations with the
recent case of Doe v. Reed,211 in which form played a mysterious, if not
wholly inscrutable, role. Accordingly, the facts of the Doe case nicely
present the question of form at its most elemental level.
a. Context and the Court’s Decision in Doe
The Doe v. Reed case began in Washington State, where referendum
petitions are part of the public record and the names and addresses of
petition signers are available to everyone on the internet.212 The plaintiff
Does signed a petition seeking to place a recently enacted everything-butmarriage gay-rights law on the ballot to be weighed by the electorate in a
general election.213 The petition itself was a success, gaining sufficient
signatures to suspend the everything-but-marriage law until a state-wide
referendum vote.214
Before the referendum, the State of Washington decided to publish the

209. See id.
210. Portions of this section are drawn in edited form from a chapter on the Doe case in the
forthcoming book, RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH (2012).
211. John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
212. Id. at 2815.
213. Id. at 2815–16.
214. Id.
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names and addresses of all petition signatories on the internet, as they
qualified as public records under the Washington public records law.215 The
petition signers sued to block disclosure of their names and addresses,
claiming that publication of their names and addresses by the State would
violate their First Amendment rights.216
The Court’s opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, was brief, and its
sparseness left the definition of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim
unclear:
The compelled disclosure of signatory information on referendum
petitions is subject to review under the First Amendment. An
individual expresses a view on a political matter when he signs a
petition under Washington’s referendum procedure. In most cases,
the individual’s signature will express the view that the law subject
to the petition should be overturned. Even if the signer is agnostic
as to the merits of the underlying law, his signature still expresses
the political view that the question should be considered “by the
whole electorate.” In either case, the expression of a political view
implicates a First Amendment right.217
Justice Thomas addressed more clearly the First Amendment interest he
believed was threatened by disclosure of the petition names:
This Court has long recognized the “vital relationship between”
political association “and privacy in one’s associations,” and held
that “[t]he Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of
political associations and beliefs.” This constitutional protection
“yield[s] only to a subordinating interest of the State that is
compelling, and then only if there is a substantial relation between
the information sought and an overriding and compelling state
interest.”218
In order to explore the expressive association claim in Doe, and largely
fill in an area left unaddressed by the Court, it is essential that the precise
nature of the constitutional claim in the case be defined. The case did not
involve a state restriction on the vote or its expressive message.219 Instead,
the relevant state action for First Amendment purposes was the

215. Id. at 2816.
216. Id. at 2816–17.
217. Id. at 2817.
218. Id. at 2839 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
219. See, e.g., id. at 2829 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining the nature of the case and lack of
any vote restriction issues).
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government’s distinct act of disclosing the vote—in this case the name of the
referendum signator and, thus, the signator’s vote—in other words,
disclosure of how the signator voted.220
In fact, the claimed state action was even narrower, because disclosure
of the names still did not reveal the reason behind a signator’s support for
the referendum.221 Even if a person signed the petition mistakenly, or did so
for reasons other than supporting a referendum on the gay rights legislation,
according to the Chief Justice, the act of signing or voting was still
expressive, and the state disclosure of the signator’s name and address still
triggered First Amendment scrutiny.222
Even setting aside problems with that attribution assumption, should the
State’s disclosure be enough to trigger First Amendment protection? Here
matters become even murkier. Does the revelation of one’s personal view
through a general rule of state disclosure qualify as a First Amendment
claim? It could, under certain conditions, but those seem unlikely. General
state disclosure may qualify for First Amendment protection, for example, if
the First Amendment contains a very strong right of anonymous speech that
(a) entitles an individual to force nondisclosure of his or her preference (here
an attributed meaning given to the simple act of signing); (b) applies even
though the State’s action stems from a general public-records regime
(consider, for example, e-mail to a public official or candidate for office);
and (c) applies even if the voter/signer did not seek anonymity at the time of
the expressive act or even claim afterward that simple disclosure, as opposed
to disclosure that could result in threats of harm, would be problematic.223
The likelihood that Doe invoked such a right is very, very slim indeed.
First, such a strong claim would destroy public disclosure laws generally,
and would do so in the political arena with particular force.224 Second, Doe
was decided shortly after the Court’s broad conclusions, expressed in
Citizens United, that disclosure does not prevent or restrict speech and that
the federal disclosure regime for political contributions and expenditures
was perfectly constitutional.225 It is hard to imagine an anonymity claim

220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 2818 (majority opinion).
223. For further discussion on Doe v. Reed and anonymous speech see Chesa Boudin, Note,
Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous Speech, 120 YALE L. J. 2140
(2011).
224. See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2164 (“The modern right to anonymous speech is in tension with a
parallel doctrine of disclosure.”).
225. See id. at 2821; Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
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strong enough to explain Doe yet coexist with Citizens United.
b. Formless Association
It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to view state disclosure of a petition
vote as a violation of a First Amendment right to free speech. This leaves
only one remaining claim: a right to the privacy of expressive association.226
Such a claim, to be clear, would in theory be that the State’s disclosure of
the signer’s mute act would compromise his or her right of expressive
association.227 The act of signing would represent a real or attributed
message of affiliation with an association of like-minded people.228 This, in
turn, would inhibit or restrict the signer’s right to so affiliate or associate for
purposes of expression—not expression through voting, but expression
through affiliation with others through messages and beliefs expressed
privately within the group or publicly through public speech or expressive
action (like a public sit-in or protest or advertisement).229
Such a claim would rest on an interest in privacy.230 That is, not strictly
a claim of anonymity, but instead a First Amendment interest in keeping
one’s affiliations and associations in groups confidential, lest the very
purposes of the groups—to engage in private forms of expression and
inquiry—be defeated.231 The claim, in other words, is group and affiliation
oriented, unlike the anonymity claim, which is individually isolated. It is
also a claim resting on personal inhibition of expression through affiliation,
not, as the Court seemed to treat it in Doe, a claim of physical safety
compromised by threats or intimidation by others.232
Such an expressive association claim rests on the person’s mental state
and personal preferences. In theory, such a claim could have been made in
Doe, but the Chief Justice didn’t expressly refer to it. Only Justice Alito233
and, more fully, Justice Thomas,234 addressed and supported such a claim.

226. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (tracing the NAACP’s
claim along these lines).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See generally Christopher R. Edgar, The Right to Freedom of Expressive Association and the
Press, 55 STAN. L REV. 191, 192–93 (2002).
230. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
231. See id.
232. See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2825 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Once again, permitting the government
to require speakers to disclose such information runs against the current of our associational privacy
cases. But more important, when speakers are faced with a reasonable probability of harassment or
intimidation, the State no longer has any interest in enabling the public to locate and contact
supporters of a particular measure—for in that instance, disclosure becomes a means of facilitating
harassment that impermissibly chills the exercise of First Amendment rights.”).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2838–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The identity and nature of the expressive association at issue in Doe was
thus almost completely unclear and surprisingly unlimited.
In previous expressive-association cases there has always been an
association, or a formal affiliation of some kind, that could be identified and
judged for First Amendment purposes.235 Such affiliations had traditionally
been formal membership groups with their own expressive missions and
activities.236 Examples from the cases abound: the NAACP; Rotary Clubs;
the Jaycees; the Boy Scouts; churches; religions; religious and philosophical
groups; political organizations, such as PACs; campaign committees; and so
forth.237 Even corporations may claim to be affiliations for the purposes of
expressive-association protection.238 But missing in Doe is any requirement
that a particular belief or affiliation be identified, or even exist, or that any
group, large or small, formal or informal, be shown to be engaged in
expressive activity.239 Indeed, it seems clear from the circumstances in
which the case arose and the evidence upon which it relied that no
identifiable affiliation or group existed for the Does or other anonymous
claimants.240 Nor was such a group alleged to be involved in any way.241
This reveals the two central problems in Doe, both of which are
instructive on the expressive-association issue. First, the Court recognizes a
claim of speech based on a mute act—signing—whose message of belief is,
at best, wholly a product of attribution by those who see nothing more than
an act of signing, or voting, disclosed by the State.242 Second, and critical
for our purposes, the message lacks any reference to a formal association.243
The very idea of expressive association seems undermined by the
apparent absence of any association upon which the Does rested their
claimed freedom from public disclosure.244 What does that mean for the

235. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP,
357 U.S. 449.
236. E.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640; Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; NAACP,
357 U.S. 449.
237. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640; Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; NAACP, 357
U.S. 449.
238. Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548–49 (noting that corporations have rights of expressive
association).
239. Doe, 130 S. Ct. 2811.
240. See id. There were groups, but no affiliation claimed by Does or others, as if affiliation were
not relevant. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2818.
243. See id. at 2815–21.
244. See id.
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nature and meaning of expressive association claims under the First
Amendment? Virtually all of the previous expressive association claims
have rested on an association—a formal group or organization with
ascertainable functions, practices, and beliefs or expressive missions.245
Such a functional association arguably must exist because some
organizational foundation is necessary to achieving the very expressive
purposes the First Amendment seeks to protect.
Expressive association may protect multiple interests. Expressive
groups support an individual’s formation and exploration of beliefs through
interaction with like-minded or similarly inclined people.246 They comfort,
reinforce, or challenge the individual.247 Such groups also enhance the
power of individual beliefs or ideas as members speak and act together, as
well as when they employ organizational methods not available to
individuals.248 The group can act collectively on their beliefs—politically,
economically, morally, and ideologically.249 It can amplify and focus the
message of its beliefs to the outside world.250 It can provide succor to those
within the group—strengthening and reinforcing ideas, emotions, views, and
beliefs.251
Typically, an expressive association is built on a belief or set of ideas.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, qualifying First Amendment
expressive associations do not include mere social clubs or groups whose
specific reasons for existing cannot be reduced to clear focus, like the Rotary
Club or the Jaycees.252 The reason, from a First Amendment perspective, is
that expressive associations are protected because they serve as alternative
forms by which the individual’s own beliefs can be expressed and
explored.253 It is expression that is the important common denominator.
There is nothing in the Doe case to suggest that the Does signed the
Washington referendum as members of a group or in coordination with a
belief-based association.254 All the signators did was sign a petition, an
expressively ambiguous act, at best.255 The motivations of individual
signators cannot be ascertained simply by noting this act alone. The fact that

245. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
246. Malanga, supra note 200, at 759.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. E.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
250. See, e.g., Welcome to the Christian Legal Society, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y,
http://www.clsnet.org/ (last visited Sep. 26, 2012).
251. See, e.g., id.
252. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part III.A.
254. See John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2011).
255. Id. at 2813.
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there were groups actively involved in the petition and referendum process
on all sides—religious and political—is legally irrelevant and hardly even
mentioned in the many pages of opinions.256
c. An Alternative Approach: Privacy and Freedom from Association
An alternative approach to understanding the Court’s Doe decision is
that the constitutional interest in the case is freedom from compelled or
unwanted expressive association, possibly akin to the Court’s freedom from
compelled speech doctrine.257 The argument would go something like this:
the government should not use disclosure to compel individuals to affiliate
or associate with one or more groups with which the individual disagrees or,
at least, chooses not to join. This protection may apply even if the
compulsion stems from a general government program and results from
affiliation and association that is purely a function of attribution by others.
Would such a claim make constitutional and logical sense? If the
compelled association were the direct result of the government’s acts and
involved a requirement of real association, the claim would make sense and,
more importantly, consist of a conventional freedom of association (or nonassociation) claim. That is, the value of associations—the value of gathering
with people who share one’s own beliefs or expressed views—is disrupted
by a compelled arrangement.258 Forced association, against an individual’s
will and contrary to his or her views, would violate the very constitutional
purposes that support the protection of associations.259
But applying this alternative approach to Doe creates serious problems.
The government is compelling nothing and, indeed, it is saying nothing. It is
simply disclosing an already public act with clearly ambiguous expressive
significance.260 Disclosure does not force participation in any group—like a
pro-beef group, or a non-pacifist group in New Hampshire. If by attribution
one is forced, as the Court said Maynard was, to carry and publish a
disagreeable view, ample recourse would be available in the compelled-

256. See id.
257. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977).
258. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
259. Id.
260. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2836 (“That would have been utterly implausible, since the inhabitants of
the Colonies, the States and the United States had found public voting entirely compatible with “the
freedom of speech” for several centuries.”).
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speech doctrine and in the privacy and defamation torts.261 Association,
except in the loosest sense of the term, is not pertinent in any way.
A classic expressive association claim rests on the notion that
individuals will be inhibited in speaking through and with groups and
associations.262 The relevant harm to the First Amendment right, in other
words, is inhibition in its exercise, not the suffering of any particular and
limited form of harm like physical threats and intimidation.263 The proof of
harm consists not of the likelihood of physical threats, as in Doe, but in the
state of mind of the claimants who are moved not to undertake risk of
consequences, whatever their nature and notwithstanding their uncertainty.
The evidence consists of testimony of persons who will not join expressive
groups in the absence of protection from disclosure of their vote and the
reasonableness of their apprehension in the surrounding circumstances—not,
as in Doe, of proof of violence against signers or, perhaps, its almost certain
occurrence in the near future.264
Why was the Court’s approach to the Doe case so much narrower? A
broader associational claim based on the more general harm of inhibition—a
particularly tenable claim—would be legally uncontainable, and thus would
seriously threaten the disclosure regime that the Court had recently given its
constitutional blessing in Citizens United.265 Disclosure alone, the Court
said, doesn’t prevent anyone from voting, or from joining groups or
associations in speaking in a campaign setting.266 So much, then, for the
classic and traditional expressive-association claim, and, in fact if not in
legal fiction, so much for the Court’s statement that signing a petition, or
voting, is an expressive act protected by the First Amendment free-speech
guarantee.
Without an identifiable form or group identity, without a remedy
oriented to affiliation and belief, without any need for affiliation, the
expressive association claim is like a boat with neither sail nor rudder—
formless, inert, and directionless.
Form, affiliation, and collective
expressive action matter. Thus, for an expressive association to exist, some
tangible form must be discernible.

261. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (holding that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require
individuals to participate in dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on their private
property, and, therefore, that the state could not require plaintiffs to display state motto upon their
vehicle license plates).
262. E.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648 (“The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”).
263. Id.
264. Compare Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2816, with Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648.
265. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010).
266. Id. at 914.
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2. Expressive Ambiguity in Belief or Message
One of Doe’s weaknesses as an expressive association case was the
absence of a formal association. The other is the ambiguity of the
expression: as discussed above, affixing one’s name to a petition says little
about the motivations and ideas that underlie an individual’s support for a
referendum.267 In the Doe case, therefore, a group’s expression was unclear
because of the uniform simplicity of the expressive act (signing a petition).
The Court, however, had struggled with an association’s expressive clarity
only several years before, in Rumsfeld v. FAIR.268 Unlike Doe, the lack of
clear expression in FAIR was based on the diffused structure of the
association itself.269
a. Introduction to Rumsfeld v. FAIR
In expressive association cases, determining the coherence of a group’s
message is essential: if the Court is to protect group speech under the idea of
expressive association, the existence and strength of the expression is
arguably as important as the existence and strength of the association. As
the Court noted in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, expressive association is valuable
because “[t]he right to speak is often exercised most effectively by
combining one’s voice with the voices of others.”270 Thus, the group’s
message itself must also have form.
The Court has long included the existence of expression in its list of
requirements when applying expressive association, but has not delved
deeply into analysis of the depth and coherence of that expression.271 FAIR
centered on the application of the Solomon Amendment, which requires
educational institutions to provide military recruiters equal access to
students.272 If any part of an institution fails to provide military recruiters
with a level of student access equal to the access provided to the mostprivileged recruiters, the institution loses a portion of its federal funding.273
FAIR is a coalition of law schools and law school faculties opposing

267.
268.
(2006).
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See supra Part IV.C.1.c.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 68–70
Id. at 68.
Id.
E.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649 (2000).
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 56.
Id.
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discrimination.274 Its rallying cry—and the coalition’s first project—was the
overturning of the Solomon Amendment.275 Faculty members at coalition
schools objected to the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, and sought
to respond to the policy by restricting military recruiters’ access to
students.276 The Solomon Amendment threatened to strip funding in
response to those policies.277
FAIR challenged the Solomon Amendment on First Amendment
grounds, focusing on free speech claims and arguing, in essence, that by
requiring law schools to provide military recruiters with access to students,
the government was restricting the schools’ free speech—or, at least,
compelling speech.278 There are several overlapping speech issues in FAIR:
whether the Solomon Amendment restricts speech or conduct,279 whether the
act of providing access to students qualifies as expression (and therefore
qualifies for First Amendment protection),280 and whether requiring a law
school to host speech it opposes violates the school’s First Amendment
The opinion also addresses whether the Amendment
rights.281
unconstitutionally restricts the law school’s expressive conduct.282
Only in the opinion’s final section did Justice Roberts center on the idea
of expressive association.283 He begins by explaining that the Court, in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, already “recognized a First Amendment right to
associate for the purpose of speaking”284—the right of expressive association
that is the focus of this piece. In Dale, the Court had held that the New
Jersey public accommodations law requiring the group to include a
homosexual scoutmaster impaired the Boy Scouts’ message opposing
homosexuality.285
The law schools relied on the Court’s reasoning in Dale to make what
they felt was a similar argument: their message included opposition to
discrimination and military policies were discriminatory; therefore, hosting

274. Id. at 47.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. The Court found that the Solomon Amendment “affects what law schools must do—afford
equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say.” Id. at 60.
280. The Court concluded that the speech compelled by the Amendment—for example, emails
relaying an interview schedule—“is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of
conduct” and therefore allowable. Id. at 62.
281. The Court found that requiring a law school to allow military interviewers access did not
compromise the law school’s message. Id. at 63.
282. Id. at 65–66.
283. Id. at 68–70.
284. Id. at 68.
285. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–59 (2000).
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military recruiters on campus impaired their message and violated their right
to speech.286 The Court disagreed, finding the law schools’ plight
distinguishable from the Boy Scouts’.287 The Court begins its analysis with
its own summary of the holding in Dale:
[T]he Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association was violated
by New Jersey’s public accommodations law, which required the
organization to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster. After
determining that the Boy Scouts was an expressive association, that
the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its
expression, and that the State’s interests did not justify this
intrusion, we concluded that the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment
rights were violated.288
That holding requires at least five separate determinations: (1) Is the
organization in question an association?289 (2) Is it expressive (does it have
a message)?290 (3) Does the law in question require inclusion of another
member?291 (4) Does that inclusion impair the association’s expression (its
“message”)?292 (5) Does the significance of this intrusion outweigh any
competing state interest?293 Presumably, only if the court can answer “yes”
to all five questions will it hold the law unconstitutional.
The Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. FAIR focuses squarely on the third
question.294 Requiring law schools to host military recruiters, the Court
reasoned, does not require the coalition to include the recruiters in their
association: “Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus
for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members
of the school’s expressive association. . . . Unlike the public accomodations
law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school to accept
members it does not desire.”295 The Court made it clear that it is the court,
not the association, that determines whether the association’s message is

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
(2006).
295.

FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–48.
Id. at 648–53.
Id. at 646–47, 657.
Id. at 653–56.
Id. at 657–59.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 69
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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impaired: “[A] speaker cannot ‘erect a shield’ against laws requiring access
‘simply by asserting’ that mere association ‘would impair its message.’”296
b. Mixed Messages and the Court’s Silence
The Court’s analysis of inclusion seems sound: hosting a group on
campus is quite different from accepting a new member, and because the law
does not force inclusion, it does not compromise the group’s message.297
More interesting, though, is what the Court chose not to address in FAIR.
By focusing on a single aspect of the Dale test, the Court declined to address
difficult questions related to the other elements.298
For example, even if the Court determines that FAIR qualifies as an
association, it remains unclear whether a group comprised of faculties from
multiple law schools is sufficiently cohesive to engage in common
expression. Does FAIR have a clear message? What is that message? Is it
anti-discrimination? Or is it anti-military discrimination? Or is it antiSolomon Amendment? This question is important, and it is one that the
Court declines to address in either Dale or FAIR. The Court seems content
to allow the association to declare what its message is.299 But the Court
explicitly refuses to allow groups to determine whether the inclusion of a
dissenting voice will compromise its message—that role the Court reserves
for itself.300 This creates an obvious conflict: if the group declares itself
anti-Solomon Amendment, for example, the Court will have a hard time
deciding that the Solomon Amendment does not compromise the group’s
message.
Though it was FAIR that brought suit, the Court focused on whether law
schools are expressive organizations, a peculiar decision based, apparently,
on FAIR’s own pleadings.301 The Court, however, provides no analysis as to
whether a law school qualifies as an association (we would presume that it
does) and as expressive (a more open question). The Court does conclude
that FAIR has “plainly overstat[ed] the expressive nature of their activity
and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on it,” but this conclusion is not
expanded into individual analysis of the association and its expression.302
Given other opportunities to address the nature of group expression—
which would, in all likelihood, require the Court to investigate more
carefully what an expressive association’s message truly is—the Court has

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
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Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)).
Id. at 69.
Id.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653–54 (2000).
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64–65.
Id. at 68–70.
Id. at 70.
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similarly refused to do so.303
In his concurrence to the Citizens United decision, Justice Scalia
reasoned that because the Constitution did not distinguish between
individual speakers and associated speakers, the case (like the First
Amendment) was about “‘speech,’ not speakers.”304 That rhetorical flourish
allows Scalia to sidestep analysis of whether a corporation, even if it is an
association for First Amendment purposes, can be considered an expressive
one. What, though, is a corporation’s expression? Presumably its purpose is
maximizing shareholder wealth.305 That goal does not lend itself to a clear
expression the way a pro-choice group’s goals (preventing abortions) or
even the Jaycees’ goals (helping young men develop personal and leadership
skills)306 would.
Similarly, in his dissent in Doe v. Reed, Justice Thomas suggests that
signers of a petition qualify as members of an association, using a very
broad definition of the term.307 Because (1) the signers have a “common
view,” (2) more than one signer is needed to place a petition on a ballot, and
(3) the signers joined with “a state political action committee” by signing the
petition, Thomas reasoned that, “signing a referendum petition amounts to
‘political association.’”308
Thomas goes on to agree with Roberts’s majority opinion,309 which
reasons that “[a]n individual expresses a view on a political matter when he
signs a petition”—either that he believes the law should be overturned, or, at
the very least, that he believes “that the question should be considered ‘by
the whole electorate.’”310 But those two views are distinctly different—
believing that a law should be overturned expresses opposition to the
substance of the law, while believing that the entire electorate should
consider an issue expresses a commitment to a particular political process.
If, as the Court urges, we accept that expressive associations make
individual speech stronger by amplifying it through the combination of
multiple voices expressing a similar message,311 then how does sharing

303. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
304. Id.
305. See Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57 BROOK. L. REV.
113, 115 (1991).
306. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).
307. John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2839 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2818 (majority opinion).
311. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 68
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space on a petition amplify one’s voice if others have joined the petition for
entirely different reasons? In short, there is a difference between an
individual’s act being expressive and an association being expressive. Even
if the referendum signers share a common goal, one could still argue that
having a goal is different than being expressive.
In Christian Legal Society, both the majority312 and dissent313 note that
CLS members sign a pledge that commits them to certain behaviors and
beliefs. But does this make the group expressive? The dissent notes that
“many of [Hastings’] registered groups were and are dedicated to expressing
a message” and lists, as examples, a pro-choice group, a pro-life group, the
American Constitution Society, and an animal-rights group.314 The fact that
other campus groups are expressive, however, does not mean that CLS is,
and the Court never fully addresses this question, nor proposes a test to
determine what makes a group expressive.315 The examples the Court points
to seem to all be dedicated to a clear, single cause.316
CLS’s cause—and, more importantly for the Court’s analysis, its
message or expression—is less clear: is it to promote faith, or to oppose
sin?317 The law school seemed to object to two portions of CLS’s by-laws:
one that prohibited “unrepentant homosexual behavior” and another that
prohibited “non-believers” from being members.318 Does the existence of
more than one expressive purpose make the right of associative expression
more difficult to apply? Again, if we accept that expressive association
should be protected because uniting individual voices bolsters each
individual’s ability to speak, how does CLS, with its variety of loosely tied
purposes, further that goal?
c. Total Dilution: Conglomerates as Thematic Groups
The first cases that outlined the idea of expressive association protected
groups from laws that would dilute their message by requiring inclusion of
dissenting voices: protecting the Boy Scouts of America from a law that
would require them to include a gay scoutmaster,319 for example, or the
Jaycees from a law that would require them to include girls.320
(2006).
312. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2974, 2980 (2010).
313. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 3002.
315. Id. at 2971–95 (majority opinion).
316. Id. at 2984–85.
317. See generally About CLS, supra note 125.
318. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2974.
319. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
320. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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But Rumsfeld v. FAIR addressed a different kind of group: a group of
groups, really, or what we will call a conglomerate—an association of law
school faculties.321 FAIR, then, is a group of groups—a coalition of
faculties—and even if we assume that the coalition is unified in its fight
against discrimination (making the group homogenous), the subgroups are
almost certainly not unified. In fact, FAIR members join through faculty
votes, indicating the strong possibility that not all faculty members embrace
the faculty’s decision to join FAIR.322
The Supreme Court did not express any concerns about applying the
same analysis to a conglomerate that it had applied to groups of
individuals.323 But conglomerates create several identifiable problems in
expressive association analysis, one of which is a diluted—or even
conflicted—group message.
One common justification for protecting expressive association is that
supporting association also supports speech: the Court in FAIR, referring to
Jaycees, reasoned that “[t]he right to speak is often exercised most
effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of others.”324
“Combining” is an interesting word to choose, because it allows for some
variety of expression—using the word “unifying,” on the other hand, would
have suggested that the individual speakers share identical views, which is
often not the case.
This justification for protecting expressive association, however, is
strongest when the members’ views are very similar.325 The more the voices
share, the more they resonate; the more diverse the viewpoints, the less
likely it is that associating with group members helps you project your own
voice.
This rationale is problematic even in groups of individuals. Members of
the League of Women Voters, for example, may have dramatically different
political views. Is an individual member’s speech more effective because of
that association? To arrive at an agreed-upon message, often individual
members would be required to omit personal beliefs that the group as a
whole did not embrace—the voice may be louder, but it also must be
simplified.

321.
(2006).
322.
323.
324.
325.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 52
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
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This is doubly problematic for conglomerates: group messages are less
sophisticated than individual voices, and conglomerate messages less
sophisticated still. The more levels of consensus and simplification a group
incorporates, the less likely it is that the group truly makes an individual’s
speech more effective.
V. CONCLUSION: PUTTING TOGETHER THE MAP
Expressive associations are complex and varied in type, function, and
relationship to the First Amendment. The differences among them bear on
the definitional questions with which we have been concerned in this
mapping exercise. More importantly, the differences bear on the basic
reasons for constitutional protection and thus on the measures, or standards,
by which the First Amendment interests should be protected.
We conclude that there are four often overlapping elements of the
expressive association landscape—or map. They emerge from two
overarching assumptions we have made.
First, distinctions among
expressive associations grounded on substantive preferences for certain
ideas or kinds of ideas should be rejected. In this respect all expressive
associations are identical under the First Amendment, whatever the nature of
their shared beliefs. Second, as a general rule we think it necessary and
useful to think of an expressive association as little more than a
representative of the constitutional interests of its members, not as an
independent rights-holder.326 It is the associated activities of individual
members that is at the heart of constitutional liberty.327 And the group is the
instrument by which the individual members are served.
With these background principles in mind, we identify four features of
the map of expressive associations.
First, expressive associations must be based on identifiable beliefs to
which all members subscribe in fact. Beliefs are at the heart of the very idea
of expressive associations under the First Amendment.328 Moreover, this
feature explains and supports the essential distinction between beliefs and
status that was at the heart of the Supreme Court’s CLS opinion. Status is
not what the First Amendment is about.
Second, a basic distinction should be drawn between inward- and

326. This is the very approach taken by the Supreme Court in the NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson case, where the NAACP was given third party standing to represent the interests of
individual members. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
327. But see our discussion of mixed corporate and individual associations, and conglomerate
associations, for some variants on this central principle. Supra notes 208–09, 321–25 and
accompanying text.
328. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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outward-oriented expressive associations.329 This essential distinction yields
different measures of constitutional protection in view of different
constitutional functions performed: when the activities are inward, and thus
often deeply personal, the measure of constitutional protection differs from
when expression is geared toward the public, with the primary function
being brotherhood in shared beliefs and augmentation of personal views
effected by the combination of many voices. Inward is introspective and
contemplative. Outward is publicly expressive and largely mechanical in
function. The two types of expressive association activity are often
combined—that is, performed by a single expressive association—but they
must still be kept distinct in relation to any specific activity claimed to be
protected.
Third, individual membership must involve individual action and aims
undertaken with and through the group or association, not independent of it.
Affiliation focused on atomistic rewards for the individual should not be
protected in the name of expressive association rather than, for example,
individual free speech or self-improvement alone.330
Fourth, elements of form are important to determining whether a group
or an organization should qualify as an expressive association.331 The group
or association must be non-transitory; it should have a formal identity, a
mission and expressed set of beliefs, a duration, and some form of known
membership by the individuals claimed as members. Like-mindedness,
without more, won’t do. Moreover, the association should have some form
of organizational structure and governance related to member beliefs and
choices, for without these it cannot be said that the acts of the group
represent the ideas and beliefs of the individual members. Finally,
conglomerate groups are unlikely to qualify as expressive associations
because they almost always lack a coherent and core set of beliefs shared by
all members—including the members of the groups in the conglomeration—
and also lack the governance discipline to maintain fidelity to the beliefs and
mission of the collective sets of members.332
Our map, in short, focuses on beliefs; consensus and cohesion; action by
and through the group and for the group (not the individual); and a form
necessary to maintaining the protected acts as those of the collective, not the
individual or leadership or some portion of the membership.

329.
330.
331.
332.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.3.a.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.C.2.c.

73

BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/2013 12:54 PM

***

74

